

0-RTT Key Exchange with Full Forward Secrecy



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CROSSING


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


Key Exchange can be a bottleneck




drawings by *Giorgia Azzurra Marson*

Solution: 0-RTT Key Exchange



- ▶ theoretically not new
- ▶ in practice: **QUIC** (2013), **TLS 1.3** (2015+)

Problems with 0-RTT Key Exchange



replays
(partially unavoidable)


no forward secrecy
(considered in~~h~~erent)

A Similar Scenario: Asynchronous Messaging

wants to send M



$$C = \text{Enc}_{pk_B}^{t_2}(M)$$



- ▶ public-key encryption with coarse forward secrecy (CHK'03)
- ▶ fine-grained puncturable forward-secret encryption (GM'15)




Puncturable Forward-Secret Encryption Yields Forward-Secret 0-RTT Key Exchange

▶ building block: **puncturable forward-secret key encapsulation**



- ▶ we build generically from any HIBKEM
- ▶ can replace involved blend of HIBE+ABE [GM'15]
- ▶ CCA-secure in the standard model

▶ **forward-secret 0-RTT key exchange**


- ▶ we build from any PFSKEM
- ▶ formalize key exchange security with forward-secret 0-RTT




Our Forward-Secret 0-RTT Key Exchange In a Nutshell




Our Forward-Secret 0-RTT Key Exchange In a Nutshell



sync. time intervals t_0, t_1, \dots



Our Forward-Secret 0-RTT Key Exchange In a Nutshell



Evaluation (initial, based on BKP'14 HIBE)


- ✓ full forward secrecy
- ✓ replay protection

► time performance:

✓	Enc	few ms
?	Dec	few seconds
✗	Punct	few minutes


hope: need only selective security

expensive delegation



Summary

- ▶ **Fully forward-secret
0-RTT key exchange exists!**



- ▶ Generic construction and security proof
 - ▶ very simple **single-message** protocol
 - ▶ building block: **puncturable forward-secret key encapsulation**
 - ▶ from any HIBKEM
- ▶ Can we make this **practical**?



Thank You!

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